Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: The use of words consists only in sentences with these words. - Therefore, there does not have to be a direct connection of the understanding of words with a single linguistic ability. Cf. >Idiolect. II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: Without the concept of force understanding of a sentence would require nothing less than the complete knowledge of all the properties that a sentence could have in every possible situation of an utterance ("infinitely many circumstances"). >Theory of force, >Understanding. II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: 1st a) theory of reference, b ) Theory of sense, 2nd Theory of force. >Reference, >Sense, >Assertive force. II 116 Meaning Theory/Dummett: A meaning Theory is basically constructed with truth as the fundamental concept - here we follow the alternative: instead of verifying truth - but it s not sure if that is possible. - - - III (c) 101 A meaning Theory Theory of meaning/Davidson: presupposes that the concept of truth is understood ( and undefined ) - Precondition: hold-as-true. Translation/Davidson: it is possible to know of every sentence that it means the same as one sentence of another language without knowing what both mean - and for all sentences. III (c) 105 Meaning/Davidson: similar to translation : from T - sentence "la terra they muove" is true if and only if the earth moves " we gain by replacing the m-set " ... " means " ... ". Problem: that is no explanation of the meaning, not propositional knowledge: knowledge that the earth moves. III (c) 107 Meaning Theory: in addition we must believe that knowledge of the meaning consists in the knowledge that the earth ... - that is not merely to know that the sentence B is true. III (c) 101 Meaning Theory/Dummett: a) "modest" theory: explains no new terms: Tarski, Davidson: it refers to sentences that the speaker holds to be true ( > radical interpretation). - An unspecified language mastery is expected to come up to the understanding of the object language. b ) "dignified" theory is to explain these new terms. III (c) 132 Meaning Theory/summary/Dummett: a theory of meaning must be atomistic or molecular, not holistic. It must be dignified, not modest, generous and not sober. - It does not leak into direct attributions of meaning , but must explicitly represent what is constitutive of the knowledge of the meaning of an expression and not just what everyone needs to know. Question: must it be based on the notion of a meaning theory or not? - I do not know. - - - III (d) 133 Meaning Theory: Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for linguistic knowledge. - - - III 226 Meaning Theory/Dummett: it may not require psychological or semantic terms._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28